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I. INTRODUCTION
An attractive company that makes known its desire to find a
merger partner or announces an agreement in principle to merge
with another corporation is likely to receive multiple inquiries or
multiple offers from acquisition-minded corporations. This Note
examines various problems and duties confronting a publicly held
1195
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company' that receives multiple merger inquiries and offers. The
starting point for this analysis is one court's directive2 that a proxy
statement soliciting shareholder approval of a merger recommended
by management must disclose competing merger offers from third
parties if such offers are "definitive" and "may" be more advanta-
geous to the shareholders than the recommended merger.3 The at-
tempts to define this disclosure requirement and to determine how
management decides which offers merit disclosure raise related is-
sues: the extent of management's duty to investigate each merger
inquiry to a definitive point, the nature of the disclosure required,
the relevance of the timing of the competing offer in relation to the
progress toward shareholder voting on the earlier proposal, and the
obligations arising from the typical agreement requiring the board
of directors to use best efforts to obtain shareholder approval of a
particular merger. From both a policy and a practical standpoint,
the overriding problem is to determine the proper roles of the direc-
tors and shareholders in making the decision to merge.
II. THE DUTY UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAws To DIsCLosE
COMPETING MERGER OFFERS
The critical factor in defining the duty imposed by federal se-
curities law4 to disclose competing merger offers is determining
which competing offers, if disclosed, would assume actual signifi-
cance in a reasonable shareholder's decision whether to vote for or
1. This Note focuses on publicly held corporations subject to the federal proxy rules
adopted under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)
(hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act), although the discussion of state corporate law also applies
to privately held corporations.
2. The requirement is based primarily on rule 14a-9 promulgated under the authority
of § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, supra note 1. The rule provides in pertinent part:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral,
containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with
respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has
become false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977).
This Note does not treat separately the other bases for liability for a misleading merger
proxy statement that are provided by the Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k, 771(2), 77q (1976), and the 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). See Goolrick,
Some Disclosure Problems in Acquisition Proxy Statements and Prospectuses, 28 Bus. LAw.
111 (1972).
3. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691, at 99,053 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
4. See note 2 supra.
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against the recommended merger.5 Under present corporate law,
shareholders do not decide which merger offer to accept; they decide
only whether to accept the offer recommended by management.'
Thus, for proxy statement purposes, the materiality of a second
merger offer derives from the impact it may have on a shareholder's
evaluation of the recommended offer and not from the availability
of a second offer as a definitive, potentially more advantageous
alternative. For example, in a corporation whose stock prices are
temporarily depressed, the existence of several other merger offers
slightly below the estimated value of the recommended merger
could be material because they put into perspective any premium
over market value contained in the recommended merger.7 Before
considering several ways in which disclosure of competing offers is
material to a shareholder's decision to vote for or against the recom-
mended merger, a close analysis of the leading case in this area,
United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp.,s
and certain problems that it presents is necessary.
A. The Clevite Opinion
Clevite Corporation learned of large purchases of its stock by
U.S. Smelting and immediately sought to arrange a defensive
merger.' In its haste to consummate a friendly merger, Clevite's
management signed a preliminary agreement to merge with T.R.W.
nine days after the first contact between the two corporations, and
four and one-half hours after T.R.W.'s first formal offer. Clevite's
proxy materials failed to disclose that management had received
5. Goolrick, supra note 2, at 111 (materiality as the critical issue in proxy statement
disclosure). The leading case defining materiality for purposes of rule 14a-9 states:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . [The standard contem-
plates] a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the
omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reason-
able shareholder.
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Ward, The Legal Effect of Merger and Asset Sale Agreements Before
Shareholder Approval, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 780, 780 (1967), describing the statutory merger
procedure as follows: "The directors' role in this process is to negotiate a bargain or approve
one that the officers have made. The role of the shareholders, in most cases, is to accept or
reject the bargain."
7. In contrast, if a company's original proxy materials disclose three offers that compete
with the recommended merger, all four offers involving complex packages within a fairly
narrow range of estimated values, it is not clear that another offer, within the same estimated
value range, made by a fifth offeror two days before the scheduled shareholders' meeting,
would be material. See text accompanying notes 64-102 infra.
8. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691 (N.D. Ohio 1968).




approximately twenty other merger inquiries, which were not fully
considered, 0 and that a definitive proposal had been submitted by
Gould-National, offering a package to the holders of Clevite com-
mon stock worth almost twenty-four percent more than the T.R.W.
package." Clevite received a second Gould offer, approximately
thirty-four percent higher than the T.R.W. offer, eight days before
the scheduled shareholders' meeting. The meeting was postponed
and supplementary proxy materials were sent advising the Clevite
shareholders of the second Gould offer and affording them an oppor-
tunity to revoke any proxies previously executed. 12 The court found
that Clevite's failure to disclose the first Gould offer in the original
proxy materials was a material omission in violation of rule 14a-9,13
and that this violation was not cured by the supplementary proxy
materials disclosing the second Gould offer. The court stated that
information about "other definite merger proposals available to the
corporation" clearly would be material to a shareholder's decision
whether to approve the recommended merger, "particularly" when
such other proposals "may be of greater advantage to the sharehold-
ers."" Nevertheless, the court was unwilling to decide whether the
failure to disclose background circumstances, such as the twenty
unpursued merger inquiries and the hasty negotiation of the T.R.W.
merger, 15 constituted material omissions. Judge Battisti explained
that the materiality of these background circumstances was "almost
inexorably tied to the issue of whether the officers and directors of
Clevite have acted in good faith and consistent with their fiduciary
duties to the shareholders."' 6 For purposes of the preliminary relief
being sought, the court was unwilling to find that Clevite's manage-
ment had acted in bad faith. Although one commentator 17 has criti-
10. The court surmised that Clevite's reason for not investigating these inquiries was
its belief that prompt consummation of a merger was necessary to avoid a takeover by U.S.
Smelting. Id. at 99,042.
ii. Clevite rejected the Gould offer because of potential antitrust problems and because
it considered itself bound by the agreement that the board of directors had already signed
with T.R.W. Id.; see text accompanying notes 157-86 infra (discussion of the legal effect of a
merger agreement prior to shareholder approval).
12. The court criticized the ambiguity of the provision describing the right to revoke
existing proxies but noted that clear disclosure of this right would not have changed the
result. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 99,054.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 99,053 (emphasis in
original).
15. Smelting challenged as material omissions the nondisclosure of thirteen different
background circumstances tending to undermine the decision of Clevite's board to recom-
mend the T.R.W. merger. Id. at 99,050.
16. Id. at 99,050-51.
17. Wander, Special Problems of Acquisition Disclosure: Investment Banker's Reports,
[Voi.31:11951198
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cized Clevite's use of a "good faith" test as inconsistent with the
negligence standard's applicable under rule 14a-9,11 the interrela-
tionship between management's bad faith and the materiality of
certain circumstances surrounding a merger recommendation be-
comes apparent when one focuses on the nature of the decision to
be made by a shareholder voting on a merger recommendation.2"
This interrelationship will be analyzed after considering the short-
comings of a materiality test that equates the duty to disclose with
the selection of those competing merger offers that are "definitive"
and "may be of greater advantage to the shareholders."2
B. Definitive Merger Offers
Limiting the materiality test to definitive offers eliminates dis-
closure of casual inquiries that the inquiring party chooses not to
pursue. Such inquiries are too tentative to be significant.22 Further-
more, public disclosure of every casual merger inquiry might be
"disconcerting" to shareholders and, if staggered over a period of
time, might contribute to "unfortunate gyrations" in the market
price of the target company's stock. 23 According to one court, the
exemption from disclosure requirements also extends to any pro-
posal that the board of directors has reasonable grounds to believe
has been withdrawn.24
The definitiveness test for materiality works well in ordinary
circumstances, when management25 seeks the best available merger
terms and pursues all promising inquiries. Nevertheless, if manage-
Conflicts of Interest, Competing Offers, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 521, 546 (1976).
18. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-1301 (2d Cir. 1973).
19. See note 2 supra.
20. Because the shareholders' role in a merger transaction is simply to approve or reject
the agreement that management has negotiated, they must rely to a large extent on manage-
ment's good faith in developing and presenting a proposed merger containing the best avail-
able terms. Circumstances indicating that bad faith tainted the process of negotiating the
recommended merger are of critical importance to the shareholders' decision whether to
approve or reject the merger agreement produced by that process. See text accompanying
notes 87-102 infra.
21. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691, at 99,053 (emphasis
in original).
22. Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 65 (D.N.J. 1974) (telephone call without
any follow-up). See also Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538,554 (S.D. N.Y. 1967) (willing-
ness to pay more was not a fact when higher price merely was mentioned during negotiations);
text accompanying note 76 infra. But see Wander, supra note 17, at 547-48.
23. Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Chemetron Corp., 299 F. Supp 367, 371 (D. Del. 1969).
24. Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 194 (D. Colo. 1972).
25. The term "management" is used here in recognition of the fact that officers typi-
cally take the lead in finding a merger partner and negotiating the terms, which are then
submitted for review and approval by the directors. See Ward, supra note 6, at 780 n.3.
1978] 1199
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ment rebuffs preliminary inquiries, either because it is hastening to
consummate a defensive merger or a merger otherwise particularly
attractive to management"6 or because it believes that a preliminary
agreement to merge signed by the directors precludes consideration
of subsequent offers,2 conditioning the duty to disclose on the exist-
ence of an inquiring party persistent enough to submit a definitive
proposal would exalt form over substance. 21 In such cases, defini-
tiveness should not be a necessary element for materiality.
C. Better Offers-And Who Decides Which Offers Are Better
The questions whether the duty to disclose competing offers
applies only to offers that may be better than the recommended
merger and, if so, how much deference should be accorded to the
directors' judgment that a competing offer is not advantageous
enough to merit disclosure remain unresolved.29 Although Clevite
states that other definitive merger proposals are particularly mate-
rial when the competing proposals may be more advantageous to
shareholders than the recommended merger, the opinion can be
interpreted as requiring disclosure of all definitive proposals, re-
gardless of their relative merits.3 1 When read broadly, Clevite di-
lutes management's role in screening merger offers and gives share-
holders a primary role in choosing between alternatives available to
the corporation.31 In contrast, the decision in Alameda Oil Co. v.
Ideal Basic Industries, Inc.32 suggests that other definitive merger
offers do not require disclosure if they are less advantageous than
the merger recommended by management.13 To determine which
offers do not merit disclosure because they are less advantageous,
the Alameda court seemed willing to rely on the good faith judgment
of the directors, absent clear evidence contrary to their evaluation. 4
26. See text accompanying notes 92-93 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 187-94 infra.
28. See Goolrick, supra note 2, at 120. Indeed, Gould-National was one of the twenty
inquiring parties that Clevite had rebuffed, but Gould proceeded to submit its definitive
proposals anyway. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 99,051.
29. Wander, supra note 17, at 545-46.
30. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
31. See generally Goolrick, supra note 2, at 119-21.
32. 337 F. Supp. 194 (D. Colo. 1972).
33. One commentator characterizes as dictum Alameda's suggestion that less advanta-
geous offers do not require disclosure, observing that the suggestion followed a finding that
the offer was not definitive. Wander, supra note 17, at 545. Nevertheless, the suggestion
appears to be more than dictum with respect to the second offer, which was not described as
having been withdrawn.
34. [Tlhere is no evidence that would support a finding that the value and advan-
tage of that proposal was so clear as to impose upon the directors of PCA any obligation
1200 [Vol.31:1195
COMPETING MERGER OFFERS
Although neither Clevite read broadly nor Alameda strikes the best
balance between the participation of directors and shareholders in
merger decisions,35 each approach has limited support in other deci-
sions.
Two cases involving fundamental corporate changes provide
some support for the broad reading of Clevite giving shareholders a
primary role in choosing among the alternatives available to the
corporation. In Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.,37 the federal
district court found proxy materials seeking approval of a plan for
externalizing certain assets of a Zambian corporation to be defi-
cient, in part because the proxy materials failed to disclose an alter-
native method for externalization that the board of directors had
considered but rejected in accordance with strong advice from the
corporation's financial adviser. 9 Even though the undisclosed alter-
native seemed clearly undesirable, the court thought it should have
been disclosed to the shareholders. Nevertheless, two factors limit
the impact of the district court's insistence on the shareholders'
right to choose. First, the district court considered full disclosure of
both alternatives to be the only way to counteract the likelihood of
self-dealing because the recommended method of externalization
provided unique benefits for the major corporate stockholder. 0 Sec-
ond, the Third Circuit on appeal found it unnecessary to decide
whether the failure to disclose the alternative method for externali-
zation was material.
41
In Robinson v. Penn Central Co.41 a federal district court
stressed the right of shareholders to choose between an immediate
reorganization and the recommended refinancing of debt. The Penn
Central proxy materials were found materially deficient because
their failure to explain that a likely consequence of the recom-
mended refinancing would be mere postponement of bankruptcy
deprived the shareholders of an adequate basis for making an in-
to repudiate or delay the merger with Ideal Cement for the purpose of submitting the
Susquehanna proposal to the stockholders.
337 F. Supp. at 196 (emphasis added).
35. See text accompanying notes 56-63 infra.
36. See Goolrick, supra note 2, at 119-21.
37. 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 874 (1972).
38. The corporation externalized those assets exempt from the nationalization ordered
by the Zambian government.
39. The corporation's longtime investment banker threatened to resign if the corpora-
tion adopted this alternative method for externalization. 458 F.2d at 293.
40. 322 F. Supp. at 1354.
41. 458 F.2d at 264.
42. 336 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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formed choice between the available alternatives. 3 Nevertheless,
when a stockholder challenged a revised version of the same proxy
materials in Allen v. Penn Central Co.," the court retreated from
the implication in Robinson that shareholders should make the pri-
mary decision among available alternatives. Rejecting the plain-
tiff's contention that the revised proxy materials should have in-
cluded a complete discussion of the immediate reorganization alter-
native and its consequences,45 the Allen court recognized the need
for management to screen alternatives. The court explained that
requiring proxy statements to go beyond a'full explanation of man-
agement's proposal and to provide "a forum for every possible disa-
greement with the proposed course of action"48 would produce an
incomprehensible "avalanche"47 of information inconsistent with
the purpose of proxy statement regulation.48
The Alameda position that a competing merger offer is not
material unless clearly advantageous and that the screening of offers
by the directors should receive substantial deference finds partial
support in Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.49 and Elgin National
Industries, Inc. v. Chemetron Corporation.50 In Smallwood, Pearl
Brewing Company's search for a merger partner yielded one pro-
posal from a newly organized company, which Pearl rejected sum-
marily, and two other proposals, the Aztec and Southdown offers,
which were referred to a consulting firm for analysis. The consulting
firm reported that either merger would benefit Pearl, but the firm
recommended the Aztec proposal as slightly better." Despite this
recommendation, Pearl's board of directors decided to pursue the
Southdown proposal, and a Pearl-Southdown merger was consum-
mated. The plaintiff challenged Pearl's proxy statement concerning
the Southdown merger, citing the failure to disclose the Aztec pro-
posal and the consulting firm's recommendation. The jury's special
finding, described but not discussed in the published opinion,"2 that
43. Id. at 657; see Goolrick, supra note 2, at 120.
44. 350 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
45. Brief reference to the alternative of immediate reorganization was found sufficient.
Id. at 703.
46. Id. at 705.
47. Id. See also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976).
48. 350 F. Supp. at 703.
49. 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), aff'g Smallwood v. Southdown, Inc., 382 F.Supp. 1106 (N.D.
Tex. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
50. 299 F. Supp. 367 (D. Del. 1969).
51. The consulting firm opined that the Aztec offer had " 'more upside potential near
term.' " 489 F.2d at 585.
52. Id. at 588. The primary challenge to the proxy materials was the alleged inadequate
disclosure of the power of the Pearl board to waive an underwriting commitment covering
shares that the Pearl shareholders received in the merger.
[Voi.31:11951202
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neither omission was material apparently indicates a willingness to
defer to the board's business judgment.53 In Elgin shareholders chal-
lenged a proxy statement seeking approval of measures designed to
make takeovers more difficult for not disclosing prior merger in-
quiries received by the corporation.54 Finding that plaintiff had not
shown a reasonable likelihood of ultimate success and therefore was
not entitled to a preliminary injunction against management's vot-
ing of proxies, the court observed that the "wisdom of passing on to
stockholders approaches made to management concerning exchange
or merger offers lies within the bona fide discretion of the direc-
tors.""
Despite the partial support provided by these cases, the ap-
proaches of both Clevite, broadly read, and Alameda have substan-
tial disadvantages in the multiple merger proposal context. A
Clevite per se disclosure requirement could become acutely unwork-
able when applied to competitive merger offers received after proxy
materials have been distributed. 6 Even if management received all
definitive offers prior to mailing the proxy materials, disclosure of
very low offers would clutter the proxy statement unnecessarily.57
Moreover, if management received a substantial number of offers,
disclosure of all offers could be confusing to the shareholders., On
the other hand, the Alameda rule59 that competitive offers need not
be disclosed unless clear evidence of the "value and advantage"" of
any such offer is present does not recognize that some nearly com-
petitive offers may be material to the shareholders' evaluation of the
recommended merger. For example, as discussed below, the exist-
ence of several slightly less valuable offers may put into perspective
a recommended merger offering a premium that otherwise would be
viewed as a windfall.' In attempting to recognize the role of direc-
tors in screening the merger proposals that should be presented to
the shareholders, the Alameda court seems to make the directors'
good faith business judgment as to which offer should be recom-
mended presumptively determinative of the question whether the
rejected offers merit any disclosure to the shareholders.2 Such de-
53. Id. at 588.
54. 299 F. Supp. at 370.
55. Id. at 371.
56. See note 72 and text accompanying notes 132-56 infra.
57. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976).
58. See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
59. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
60. 337 F. Supp. at 195.
61. See text accompanying notes 83-84 infra.
62. The brief Alameda opinion consists only of conclusory statements that obscure the
1978] 1203
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ference to directors infringes on the right of shareholders to make
an informed decision on the merger recommendation. 3
Ill. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO MATERIALITY
The tests discussed thus far for determining the materiality of
and the need to disclose competing merger proposals 4 or tentative
merger inquiries " are inadequate. The materiality issue should be
resolved by an examination of each merger proposal or inquiry in
terms of the specific effect that its disclosure would likely have on
the shareholders' evaluation of the recommended merger's desira-
bility.6
The precise information that disclosure of other merger inquir-
ies or competing offers will provide varies according to the circum-
stances surrounding the recommendation of a particular merger.
For example, the existence of other firm merger offers comparable
to the recommended offer will normally be material to the share-
holders' evaluation of the overall fairness of the recommended offer
because the other offers indicate the intensity of demand"7 for
merger with the shareholders' company. If the recommended merger
includes an unusually high premium in light of the book value of
the target company's assets or the market value of its stock, disclo-
sure of competing offers with similarly high premiums provides
objective evidence that the company's assets are undervalued or its
stock values temporarily depressed. 8 Competing offers that put a
compellingly attractive merger into perspective are particularly
material to shareholder appraisal of the recommended merger. 9 An
even stronger presumption of materiality may exist when disclosure
of other merger inquiries and competing offers would suggest a fail-
court's reasoning. Nevertheless, the court's findings that the board of directors had exercised
good faith, independent judgment in making the merger recommendation and that the evi-
dence of the competing proposal's "value and advantage" was not "so clear" as to require
disclosure seem to raise a presumption that competing merger proposals rejected by the board
do not require disclosure. 337 F. Supp. at 195.
63. See text accompanying notes 64-69 infra (summarizing significant information that
may be provided by disclosure of a competing merger offer).
64. See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
66. Goolrick, supra note 2, at 126. Goolrick would evaluate disclosure requirements for
merger proxy statements based on the disclosure purpose of providing shareholders of the
acquired company with all material information concerning the desirability of investing in
the acquiring company and the value of his stock in the acquired company.
67. See generally Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("knowledge of the intensity of demand is essential to determination of a
fair price in a market economy.").




ure by management to use its best efforts to obtain the most advan-
tageous terms available for the company as a whole.' Such a situa-
tion might arise, for example, if the directors hasten to conclude a
merger that is particularly attractive to management.
Distinctions between competitive offers that have only a gen-
eral impact on the evaluation of a merger's fairness and those that
have a more specific impact by evidencing undervalued assets, de-
pressed stock values, or management conflicts of interest might be
labelled as academic. Certainly, the safest approach is to resolve
any doubt in favor of materiality and to disclose competing offers7'
received before proxy solicitation begins. After the solicitation pe-
riod begins and as the shareholder meeting date draws closer, how-
ever, requiring disclosure of subsequent merger offers becomes in-
creasingly burdensome, particularly if resolicitation of proxies is
necessary. 72 Several courts have exhibited a sensitivity to the po-
tential harshness of requiring disclosure and resolicitation for last
minute developments.7 3 Thus, distinctions in the degree of mate-
riality involved will assist in balancing disclosure policy against
business practicalities and in deciding whether a last minute mer-
ger offer must be disclosed and, if so, whether complete resolicita-
tion of proxies is necessary. Moreover, in situations uncomplicated
by timing problems, defining the specific purpose served by dis-
closure will aid both in determining the necessary extent of dis-
closure of competing offers and in deciding whether merger inquiries
not rising to the level of firm offers merit disclosure. 4
A. Intensity of Demand
Absent special circumstances, 5 determination of the material-
70. See text accompanying notes 87-102 infra.
71. See text accompanying notes 103-31 infra (discussion of the appropriate extent of
disclosure).
72. The burdens and risks entailed when post-mailing events must be disclosed include
the expense and inconvenience of preparing and distributing a supplement to the proxy
statement and of redistributing the original proxy statement if shareholders are likely to have
discarded it, any postponement of the shareholders' meeting necessary to allow effective
disclosure or resolicitation of proxies, and the possibility that delay in consummation of the
merger would jeopardize the effectiveness of a defensive merger or precipitate the other
party's withdrawal from the proposed merger and thus substitute for a favorable and almost
completed merger the mere possibility of a better bargain. See United States Smelting, Ref.
& Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,691 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Scott v. Stanton Heights Corp., 388 Pa. 628, 131 A.2d 113 (1957).
73. See text accompanying notes 136-41 infra.
74. See text accompanying notes 76, 79, 92-93, 125-31 infra.
75. Special circumstances may include hidden values in the target company, conflicts
of interest, or an inadequate basis for management's recommendation. See text accompany-
ing notes 83-102 infra.
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ity and the appropriate content of disclosures concerning competing
merger offers should focus on the information necessary to apprise
shareholders of the general attractiveness of their company as a
merger partner and should not attempt to provide a complete com-
parative evaluation of each offer. If the purpose of disclosure is
informing shareholders of the intensity of demand for their corpora-
tion, mere inquiries that are too casual to establish as a fact" the
existence of a third party interest need not be revealed. In addition,
bad faith offers made only to frustrate consummation of the pro-
posed merger should not be disclosed because such offers are not
meaningful indications of the target company's value."
The extent of disclosure required for comparable 8 firm offers
should be limited to a summary of terms adequate to show that the
competing offers are in the same range of value as the recommended
merger. Outlining the terms of several representative offers, with a
brief reference to the remaining offers, would demonstrate the in-
tensity of demand more effectively than cluttering79 the proxy state-
ment with a description of each offer when the target company
receives a large number of competing offers. Once the mailing of
proxy materials makes disclosure of subsequently received offers
more burdensome, 8 consideration of the purposes of disclosing com-
peting offers may reveal critical distinctions in the degree of materi-
ality involved. For example, if the proxy materials disclosed two or
more competitive offers, the receipt of another offer during the solic-
itation period similar in value to those previously disclosed might
not be material with respect to the company's general attractiveness
as a merger partner.8 1 Even if no other competitive offers had been
received or disclosed previously, one competitive offer received late
in the solicitation period might not be material enough to require
disclosure or resolicitation.12
76. See Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (willingness to pay
more was not a fact when higher price merely was mentioned during negotiations). But see
Wander, supra note 17, at 547-48. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECUmTIES
REGULATION 921-26 (4th ed. 1977).
77. See generally Ward, supra note 6, at 783.
78. Competing offers significantly higher than the recommended merger are discussed
in the text accompanying notes 94-98 infra.
79. If all 20 inquiries received by Clevite had ripened into definitive offers, each of 20
separate descriptions of these offers would probably not have "assumed actual significance
in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder." See generally TSC Indus., Inc. v. North-
way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
80. See note 72 supra.
81. See generally TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). In
contrast, if the purpose of disclosing competing merger offers was to give shareholders a
primary role in choosing among the available alternatives, the subsequent offer would require
disclosure. See text accompanying notes 36-43 supra.




When particular circumstances such as undervalued assets or
temporarily depressed stock values make appreciating the attrac-
tiveness of a company more difficult for its shareholders, competing
merger offers may become more material than usual. Courts have
recognized that outside offers to purchase a corporation's assets at
prices substantially above book value are sufficiently objective and
reliable, in contrast to appraisals by management, to merit disclo-
sure whenever the value of the corporation's assets is material in a
matter requiring shareholder approval. 3 Similarly, if a recom-
mended merger contains an unusually high premium in light of
book value or stock prices, disclosure of competing merger proposals
offering comparable premiums would provide reliable evidence that
the corporation has some hidden value. A competing merger pro-
posal becomes significantly more material if both it and the recom-
mended merger contain premiums approximately thirty percent
over the market price of the target company's stock, as opposed to
the typical fifteen percent merger premium."
Most of the considerations discussed above," with respect to
competing merger offers that indicate a company's general attrac-
tiveness as a merger partner apply equally when hidden values ac-
count for part of that attractiveness. As noted previously, when the
untimeliness of a competing proposal significantly increases the
burdens and risks attached to supplemental disclosure, the purpose
served by such disclosure becomes significant. For example, an un-
timely offer that puts into perspective a recommended merger that
shareholders predictably viewed as a windfall would be more mate-
rial than if the shareholders believed the recommended offer in-
cluded only a typical merger premium. In the former situation, the
competing offer would significantly alter "the 'total mix' of informa-
tion" relevant to the shareholder's decision.8
C. Conflicts of Interest and Inadequate Basis for Recommendation
Disclosure of other merger inquiries or competing merger offers
may inform shareholders that self-interest or other inappropriate
83. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294-95 (2d Cir. 1973) (well-
reasoned dictum by Judge Friendly); Madonick v. Denison Mines, Ltd., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 94,550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
84. See, e.g., United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp., [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 92,691, at 99,039 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (referring to
15% as a typical merger premium).
85. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
86. See generally TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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factors interfered with management's search for the merger terms
most advantageous to the corporation. When this purpose is used
to evaluate the need to disclose circumstances surrounding the
directors' recommendation, the materiality of such circumstances
depends upon the directors' good faith performance of their fidu-
ciary duties. 87 This good faith standard relates not to disclosure
decisions8s but to the directors' substantive decisions in recommend-
ing a merger and in responding to the other merger inquiries and
competing merger proposals 9.8 The board's recommendation of a
particular merger encompasses an implied representation that a
reasonable basis exists to support the directors' judgment that the
recommended merger is the best alternative available to the corpo-
ration.98 This implied representation makes material any circum-
stances revealing that factors compromising the directors' business
judgment tainted the merger recommendation.9
Several significant consequences attach when disclosure of the
circumstances surrounding a merger recommendation reveals an
inadequate basis for or a compromise of the directors' independent
judgment. First, as Clevite suggests, tentative merger inquiries that
have not ripened into facts indicative of the corporation's attractive-
ness as a merger partner92 nevertheless should be disclosed if man-
agement, motivated by self-interest, has rebuffed such inquiries and
prevented them from developing into firm proposals.93 Second, if a
competing merger offer contains a premium significantly higher
than that contained in the previously received and recommended
87. See [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691, at 99,050-51
(N.D. Ohio 1968).
88. A negligence standard applies under rule 14a-9 to disclosure decisions in connection
with proxy solicitations. E.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-1301 (2d
Cir. 1973).
89. See 11969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691, at 99,050-51
(N.D. Ohio 1968).
90. Jacobs, What Is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule 10b-5?, 42
FORDHAM L. REV. 243, 280-86 (1973); see Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
787, 803 (2d Cir. 1969). See also SEC v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., Civ. No. 61-640 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), discussed in SEC, TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 92-93, H.R. Doe. No. 269, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); Klink, Management's Role in Recommending for or Against an Offer,
25 Bus. LAW. 845, 848 (1970); Krasik, Tender Offers: The Target Company's Duty of
Disclosure, 25 Bus. LAw. 455 (1969).
91. See Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 194 (D. Colo. 1972);
United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
92. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
93. Goolrick, supra note 2, at 120. Cf. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477,
485 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affl'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (negotiations concerning profita-
ble cancellation of a lease held material although deal not consummated by time of suit; SEC
investigation may have promptdd decision not to close the deal).
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merger, the materiality of that offer must be measured not only by
the offer's impact on the shareholder's evaluation of his company's
attractiveness as a merger partner,94 but also by the degree to which
the offer impeaches the implied representation that the directors'
recommendation reflects independent business judgment supported
by a reasonable basis. Although courts recognize that business expe-
diency sometimes justifies quick decisions,95 a merger recommenda-
tion made in seemingly justified haste could be found unsupported
by a reasonable basis if a subsequent competing offer reveals a clear
inadequacy in the terms of the recommended merger. 6 As the dis-
crepancy narrows between the premiums contained in the recom-
mended merger and a subsequent competing offer, the impeach-
ment of management's recommendation lessens, but still may be
significant if self-interest provided part of the impetus for the haste
in making a merger recommendation. 7 For example, if management
hurriedly negotiates a defensive merger to avoid takeover by a cor-
portation perceived as hostile to management as well as undesirable
for the shareholders, the self-interest of inside directors imposes a
stricter duty to justify their recommendation, and makes their rec-
ommendation more vulnerable to impeachment.
8
Finally, a competing offer that omits certain perquisites for
management contained in the recommended offer may have special
materiality, whether or not the premium for shareholders is higher
than that of the recommended merger. Competing offers assume
more significance because self-interest imposes upon inside direc-
tors a higher duty to justify their recommendation.9 Moreover,the
particular danger that the recommended merger diverts to manage-
ment an unjustified portion of the premium commanded by the
company makes comparative information about offers with prem-
iums that are free of this aspect of self-interest more important to
the shareholders. 00 Competing merger offers that omit perquisites
94. See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
95. E.g., Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), affl'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
96. Compare U.S. Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691 (N.D. Ohio 1968) and Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316
A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), affl'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974), with Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp.
538(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
97. See Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
98. See generally Klink, supra note 90, at 847.
99. Id.
100. According to one commentator, most mergers divert to management of the ac-
quired company part of the premium that the acquiring company is willing to pay for corpo-
rate control. An offer affirmatively competing with management's recommendation, however,
would pay the full premium to the shareholders. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share
Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964).
1978] 1209
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
for management indicate the premium that the corporation itself
commands. If the recommended merger contains a smaller premium
for the shareholders than competing offers, a strong likelihood exists
that the perquisites offered to management constitute a diversion
of the corporate premium. On the other hand, if the recommended
merger contains a comparable or higher premium for the sharehold-
ers, then the competing offers provide evidence that the special
perquisites constitute a legitimate effort to retain unique manage-
rial talents.'' To the extent that disclosure of competing merger
offers, tentative merger inquiries, and management's responses
would undermine the directors' recommendation of a particular
merger, such information has special materiality, particularly when
deciding whether last minute developments require disclosure and
resolicitation of proxies. 2
IV. EXTENT OF DISCLOSURE REQUIRED
Practical considerations prevent including in a proxy statement
all the information necessary for shareholders to make a fully in-
formed choice among several competing merger offers. An evalua-
tion of competing merger offers requires an examination of synergis-
tic and long-range considerations that make the choice highly com-
plex. A proxy statement that had to provide detailed business and
financial information for each competing merger offeror would be
potentially confusing and thus might violate securities laws.1'03 Em-
ploying a comparative analysis deduced from the raw data about
each offer would be equally unworkable. The court in Allen v. Penn
Central Co.' 4 recognized that when a corporation must choose be-
tween complex alternatives, any attempt to provide a thorough
analysis of each alternative would "drench the shareholder with a
flood of information," defeating the purpose of proxy statement
disclosure. 5 The Allen court also observed that management could
properly omit disclosure of the consequences of an immediate reorg-
anization because predicting the consequences would be overly
speculative.101
101. Cf. Smith v. Good Music Station, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 262, 129 A.2d 242 (1957) (asset
sale agreement was fair; payments under consulting agreements with president and his wife
were in exchange for consideration only the individuals could supply, not for corporate as-
sets).
102. See text accompanying notes 147-56 infra.
103. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976); Allen v. Penn
Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. 697, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538,
553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
104. 350 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1972).




In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Chicago & North Western
Railway Co., "7 an exchange offeror attempting to defeat a compet-
ing merger distributed to the shareholders of the target company an
investment banker's letter predicting the future workout values of
both offers and concluding that the exchange offer was "far more
attractive."' ' Finding that the letter violated rule 14a-9, the court
explained that the comparison of future values misled investors by
suggesting a degree of "competence and authority" with respect to
"the mysteries of finance" that cannot exist.' Therefore, an at-
tempt to present more than management's subjective reasons for
the recommendation by providing shareholders with an objective
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each competing
merger offer probably would be impermissibly speculative. 10
The limitations upon thorough disclosure of information con-
cerning competing offers indicate that management, not sharehold-
ers, must make the primary choice between alternatives because
shareholders denied both raw data and a complete comparative
analysis of each competing offer lack an adequate basis to make the
primary decision. Nevertheless, difficulties in defining the extent of
required disclosure remain even when the purpose of disclosure is
only to provide a basis for an informed decision on the particular
merger recommended by management." 1 For example, when a
proxy statement lists the current market value of the securities
offered under the recommended merger and under any outstanding
competing proposals, the extent to which management must moni-
tor relative changes in the market values of the different offers and
supplement the proxy statement when significant changes occur is
unclear. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co. 2 found nondisclosure materi-
ally misleading when a situation developed during the solicitation
period" '3 that had a substantial likelihood of affecting the validity
of an appraiser's report that the cash price offered to the minority
shareholders in a freeze-out merger was fair. The Parklane court
107. 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
108. Id. at 408.
109. Id. at 409.
110. In order to provide an adequate basis for shareholders to make a primary choice
among alternatives, such analysis would need to include specific predictions and would be
distinguishable from the Allen and Smallwood opinions discussed in the text accompanying
notes 123-25 infra.
111. See text accompanying notes 66-70 supra.
112. 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affl'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
113. Despite the proxy statement's assertion that no present negotiations were under-
way concerning a possible lease cancellation that might result in a substantial cash payment
to the company, Parklane made no supplemental disclosure when the stalled negotiations
resumed during the solicitation period.
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cautioned, however, that the materiality of the same post-mailing
development would be more difficult to determine if the sharehold-
ers' decision had addressed the desirability of an ongoing invest-
ment rather than the fairness of a cash-out price."' One commenta-
tor has suggested that relative changes in the market values of com-
peting offers may require supplemental disclosure, ' but adds that
justifying a fairness opinion or management recommendation in
terms of long-range considerations may diminish the need to pro-
vide such supplemental disclosure."' Absent extreme shifts in the
values of competing offers, any benefit from supplemental disclo-
sure is outweighed by both the practical difficulties of updating"1
7
and the danger of causing even greater fluctuations in the stock
values of all companies involved.
118
A second area of uncertainty is the extent to which manage-
ment must disclose the existence of any objective opinions'" favor-
ing an offer other than the one recommended by management. In
Union Pacific'20 the court strongly condemned an exchange offeror's
distribution of an investment banker's report supporting the ex-
change offer over the recommended merger offer. ' Nevertheless,
the specificity of predictions included in the investment banker's
opinion '21 and the partisan purpose for which the exchange offeror
obtained the report' 22 provide possible bases for distinguishing truly
objective opinions that do not contain specific predictions. The
Allen court 23 recognized that the specific consequences of an imme-
diate reorganization were too speculative for management to predict
but held that an objective opinion opposing the alternative recom-
mended by management should have been disclosed to the share-
holders.' 24 The objective opinion was that of a distinguished judge
114. 422 F. Supp. at 484-85.
115. Klink, supra note 90, at 851-52.
116. Id.
117. Because changes in the relative values of competing offers could occur indefinitely
and are not within the target company's control, postponement of the merger is not feasible
in this situation as a solution to the mechanical difficulties of constantly updating the proxy
materials. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973).
118. See, e.g., Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Chemetron Corp., 299 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.
Del. 1969); Quirke v. Norfolk & W. Ry., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE.
(CCH) 91,645, at 95,405 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1966) (need
for extreme care to avoid undue market fluctuations caused by premature disclosure of
merger plans).
119. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
120. 226 F. Supp. at 408.
121. Specific dollar "work-out values" were predicted. Id. at 409.
122. The competing exchange offeror solicited the report to support its offer.
123. 350 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
124. The requested remedy was denied, however. See text accompanying notes 138-41
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who, petitioned for advice by a trustee shareholder, instructed the
trustee to vote against the recommended refinancing. The result in
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co. 125 lies between the holdings in
Union Pacific and Allen. According to the Smallwood jury, the fail-
ure to disclose that a consulting firm, hired by the target company
to evaluate two competing proposals, had recommended the pro-
posal not ultimately recommended by management was not mate-
rial. The consulting firm's opinion in Smallwood, however, pos-
sessed objectivity similar to that reflected in the judge's opinion in
Allen, which, according to the Allen court, should have been dis-
closed. Although the jury verdict in Smallwood lacks significant
precedential value, the contrasting results indicate the absence of
consensus on this disclosure question.
In addition to these specific disclosure problems, target com-
panies must determine the general scope of disclosure required for
each competing offer. Resort to general principles of disclosure is
necessary to supplement judicial directives that some information
about competing merger offers must be disclosed, but that the proxy
statement need not serve as a forum for detailed discussions sup-
porting each alternative to management's recommendation. 26 Man-
agement must present enough information to enable stockholders
to make a fully informed decision, yet the presentation must be
comprehensible by unsophisticated investors, and some selectivity
in disclosing relevant facts is necessary to keep proxy statements
manageable. 7 Professors Jennings and Marsh suggest that there
may even be a duty to interpret the facts for unsophisticated in-
vestors.' Any attempt to interpret facts, however, must avoid
specific predictions about such speculative matters as future work-
out values or long-range consequences of competing offers. 29 The
proxy statement should highlight any conflicts of interest suggest-
ing a compromise of management's independent judgment concern-
ing the relative merits of competing offers. 3 ' Drafters of proxy
125. 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974).
126. Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. 697, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States
Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1[ 92,691 (N.D. Ohio 1968); see, e.g.,' Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
127. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir. 1973); Robinson v.
Penn Cent. Co., 336 F. Supp. 655, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
128. JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 76, at 928-29.
129. Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 409 (N.D. Ill. 1964);
see Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp 697 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
130. Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Kohn
v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
See also JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 76, at 928.
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materials should also be guided by the purpose to be served in dis-
closing a particular competitive offer. The summary disclosure that
may be appropriate when a competing proposal indicates nothing
more than another company's willingness to offer a typical merger
premium should be expanded when conflicts of interest are evi-
dent.'3 '
V. SPECIAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY UNTIMELY RECEIPT OF COMPETING
MERGER OFFERS
Receipt of a competing merger offer after the target company
begins solicitation and after its board of directors has agreed to use
best efforts to obtain shareholder approval of the proposed merger
presents special, interrelated problems in complying with disclo-
sure, fiduciary, and contractual obligations. In discussing these in-
terrelated problems, this Note focuses first on federal law and then
on state law.
A. A Realistic Approach to Disclosure of Competing Offers
Received After Distribution of Proxy Materials
When an event occurring after the mailing of proxy materials
and prior to the shareholders' meeting1 32 causes the proxy statement
to become materially misleading, the proxy rules'33 generally require
supplemental disclosure and, in many cases, cancellation of existing
proxies followed by a complete resolicitation. This requirement can
impose an extreme burden. For example, in a proposed merger in
which time is a critical factor,' 34 the delay necessary for resolicita-
tion could destroy the proposed transaction, wasting substantial
expenditures and extensive preparation. 35 Although supplemental
disclosure and resolicitation have been ordered when deemed neces-
sary for fair shareholder suffrage, several courts have recognized
that the expense and inconvenience entailed justify a realistic and
flexible approach to disclosure of developments during the solicita-
tion period.
131. Professors Jennings and Marsh describe the nearly total correlation between cases
in which courts have considered transactions unfair to the shareholders and cases in which
courts have found disclosure deficiencies in the proxy materials. JENNINGS & MARSH, supra
note 76, at 929.
132. Although this section focuses on material events that occur during the solicitation
period, material events that occur after the shareholder meeting but before the formal closing
of a merger also may require disclosure. See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360
F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
133. Rule 14a-9, supra note 2, has been construed to require that proxy statements be
updated to reflect material changes after the proxy statements are distributed. Jacobs, supra
note 90, at 262.
134. A defensive merger is one example.
135. See Ward, supra note 6, at 783.
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In General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc.,'38 plaintiff
sought to invalidate proxies solicited by an independent stockhold-
ers' committee, arguing that supplemental disclosure of an SEC
decision rendered three days before the scheduled meeting was nec-
essary. The SEC had held that the organizers of the committee
violated the Investment Company Act by not obtaining prior ap-
proval of their joint arrangement to acquire General Time stock.
Judge Friendly refused to adjourn the meeting and require supple-
mental disclosure and resolicitation by the stockholders' committee.
He explained that this remedy, while authorized by rule 14a-9, was
"strong medicine" requiring "a correspondingly strong showing of
materiality,' 3 which had not been made by plaintiff.
The court in Allen v. Penn Central Co.1 18 applied General
Time's flexible approach in considering management's failure to
disclose a judge's order issued nine days before the shareholders'
meeting that instructed a trustee shareholder to vote against the
refinancing plan recommended by management."13 Although finding
the omission material, the court denied the particularly harsh rem-
edy sought by plaintiff of appointing a special receiver for the Penn
Central. The Allen decision suggests that the court might have or-
dered supplemental disclosure and resolicitation had those remedies
been sought,4 ' yet it expressly acknowledged the need to weigh
practical considerations when implementing disclosure policies.
Admonishing defendants that expense and inconvenience cannot
provide a complete justification for failing to provide supplemental
disclosure of material events occurring during the solicitation pe-
riod, the court nevertheless observed that "the remedy for the omis-
sion of a material fact must vary with the circumstances."''
Other courts, however, have been less flexible in requiring man-
agement to cure defects arising when a proxy solicitation becomes
misleading because of material developments during the solicitation
period. Finding that a material development required resolicitation,
not just supplemental disclosure coupled with an opportunity to
revoke existing proxies, the court in Central Foundry Co. v.
GondelmanI reasoned that placing "the onus of obtaining restitu-
tion upon the misled stockholders" was inappropriate.' Cooke v.
136. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
137. Id. at 163.
138. 350 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
139. See text accompanying notes 123-24 supra.
140. 350 F. Supp. at 705.
141. Id.
142. 166 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
143. Id. at 446.
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Teleprompter Corp. 14 recognized that shareholder inertia substan-
tially undercuts the effectiveness of giving shareholders an oppor-
tunity to revoke as an alternative to voiding proxies executed prior
to distribution of supplementary disclosure material. Nevertheless,
because the post-mailing event 145 at issue in Cooke was apparently
well-publicized by the news media, the court voided only those
proxies dated before or on the day that the event occurred. The
court held that a right to revoke was adequate for proxies dated after
that time because the shareholders submitting those proxies knew
or should have known of the material event.'46
Rejecting the adequacy of supplemental disclosure with an op-
portunity to revoke existing proxies, the Clevite court ordered a
complete resolicitation. 41 Because this result seems consistent
under the circumstances with an equitable approach to the appro-
priate remedy, Clevite illustrates factors relevant in deciding
whether resolicitation should be required. First, the Clevite proxy
materials were deficient from the outset for failing to disclose the
first Gould offer. Mere supplemental disclosure was inadequate be-
cause it could not cure this initial defect as well as to provide suffi-
cient disclosure of the post-mailing offer. 48 Even in the absence of
a pre-mailing Gould offer that should have been disclosed, four
factors would have justified requiring resolicitation: first, the strik-
ingly higher terms offered by Gould evidenced the inadequate basis
for the directors' initial recommendation; second, numerous mail-
ings and publicity concerning the proposed merger created an
"atmosphere of great confusion;"''4 third, the company did not re-
distribute the initial proxy statement with the supplemental disclo-
sure, so that comparison was no longer possible for many sharehold-
ers; and last, insufficient time was available to evaluate and react
to the supplemental disclosure prior to the scheduled meeting. 5"
Absent a "strong showing of materiality"'' or other factors jus-
tifying resolicitation, both of which were present in Clevite, receipt
of a competing merger offer during the solicitation period should not
144. 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
145. The corporation and one of its officers were convicted of bribery.
146. 334 F. Supp. at 474.
147. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 92,691, at 99,054 (N.D.
Ohio 1968).
148. Id. at 99,053.
149. Id. at 99,054.
150. The other factors making resolicitation necessary outweighed the special difficulty,
recognized by the court, that delay presented in consummation of the defensive merger. Id.
151. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
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require more than supplemental disclosure and an opportunity to
revoke existing proxies. 52 Furthermore, a balancing of disclosure
policy against business exigencies should be employed in defining
the underlying duty to disclose, and not merely the manner of dis-
closure. As both the burdens of supplemental disclosure and the
legitimate business reasons for nondisclosure increase, the underly-
ing duty to disclose untimely merger offers should be conditioned
upon "a correspondingly strong showing of materiality.' 15 3 For ex-
ample, requiring disclosure of a second merger proposal made a few
days before the scheduled meeting and revealing only an additional
company's willingness to offer a typical merger premium seems un-
justified if the delay required to make such disclosure and to provide
sufficient time for shareholders to respond' 5' would jeopardize con-
summation of a legitimate defensive merger arranged to avoid take-
over by an unreliable company.15 The potential harm caused by
demanding disclosure in such circumstances outweighs the possible
benefit to be gained.'
B. Potentially Conflicting Obligations Under State Law
Another problem confronting the directors of the target com-
pany is determining the time at which they or their corporation
becomes contractually bound to proceed with the negotiated merger
without being free to negotiate with subsequent offerors for better
terms. Under state corporate law, customary procedure calls for the
board of directors of each company to approve an initial plan or
agreement of merger and then to submit the proposed merger to
their shareholders for approval.1 7 The directors of each company
typically promise to use their best efforts to obtain shareholder ap-
proval of the merger.'- The legal effect of this promise, however, is
unclear. One writer argues that business exigencies, the parties'
desires, and the intent of modern merger statutes to give directors
an important role in the merger process require that the directors
be authorized to enter a binding agreement to proceed with the
merger, subject to shareholder approval." 9 Nevertheless, the author-
152. See Jacobs, supra note 90, at 289.
153. 403 F.2d at 163.
154. Even if resolicitation were not required, adequate time for shareholders to digest
the disclosure and take action to revoke existing proxies would be necessary; otherwise the
disclosure would not serve any useful purpose.
155. See note 150 supra (indicating the Clevite court's recognition of this problem).
156. The cost-benefit analysis applied in defining materiality in TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976), is equally appropriate here.
157. See Ward, supra note 6, at 780.
158. See id. at 782.
159. Ward, supra note 6.
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ities do not agree on the legal effect of merger and similar agree-
ments prior to the statutorily required approval of the shareholders.
If such agreements are legally binding, they must be harmonized
with the Federal disclosure requirements concerning competing
merger offers and the directors' fiduciary duty to obtain for the
shareholders the best merger terms available. Since very little au-
thority specifically addresses merger agreements and when they
become binding, the applicable principles must be derived primar-
ily from cases arising from analogous transactions that also require
shareholder approval such as the sale of substantially all of a corpo-
ration's assets.
(1) Contractual Obligations
Viewing shareholder action as an essential ingredient of the
corporation's consent to entering a contract, several courts have
held that agreements requiring shareholder approval have no bind-
ing legal effect until management obtains that approval." For ex-
ample, in Finklea v. Carolina Farms Co.,' 6' plaintiff sought specific
performance of an agreement, executed by the corporation's presi-
dent and made subject to shareholder approval, giving plaintiff an
option to purchase all of the corporation's land. When informed by
the president that another party had made a higher offer after the
signing of the option agreement with plaintiff, the shareholders re-
jected plaintiff's tender of the purchase price. The court denied
relief, holding that the option agreement could not bind the corpora-
tion without shareholder approval and that the agreement had not
preempted the president's fiduciary obligation to advise the share-
holders of the higher offer.'6 - In Smith v. Good Music Station, Inc.' 3
and Masonic Temple, Inc. v. Ebert,'6 asset purchase agreements
signed by the proposed purchasers and executive officers of the pro-
posed sellers were characterized as constituting, prior to approval
by the proposed sellers' shareholders, mere offers by the proposed
purchasers. Having reached this conclusion, the Masonic Temple
court allowed the proposed purchaser to withdraw his "offer" with-
out liability prior to its "acceptance" by the proposed seller's share-
holders.'6
5
160. See id. at 792.
161. 196 S.C. 466, 13 S.E.2d 596 (1941).
162. The court also rejected any personal liability of the president under the contract.
Id. at 471, 13 S.E.2d at 598.
163. 36 Del. Ch. 262, 129 A.2d 242 (1957).
164. 199 S.C. 5, 18 S.E.2d 584 (1942).
165. Id. at 12, 18 S.E.2d at 587.
1218 [Vol.31:1195
COMPETING MERGER OFFERS
In American Cyanamid v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.,'6 the
court held that an asset sale agreement was not a mutually binding
contract prior to the consent of the purchaser's full board of direc-
tors, which was required by both the agreement and the purchaser's
bylaws. 6 7 Before the buyer's board of directors could act, the seller
gave notice of its withdrawal from the transaction and proceeded to
accept a better offer received after the first agreement was signed.
Although the seller's potential liability for impermissibly withdraw-
ing an irrevocable offer made summary judgment for the corporate
defendants inappropriate, the American Cyanamid court held that
liability could not be premised on the existence of a binding, bilat-
eral contract because the buyer was not bound until its board acted.
The court did grant summary judgment in favor of the individual
defendants who signed the agreement as officers of the seller corpo-
ration and as executors of the estate that owned all of the seller's
stock. "' Finding no malice or fraud to justify imposing liability on
these agents who clearly acted in a representative capacity, the
court noted that as fiduciaries, the agents were in a "difficult posi-
tion" because of the better offer and their obligation to act for the
estate's best interest."9
Under Finklea, Smith, Masonic Temple, and American
Cyanamid, a merger agreement executed by the target company's
board of directors presents no contractual obstacles to compliance
with either the directors' fiduciary obligations or federal securities
law. 170 Prior to shareholder approval and absent any malice or fraud
on the part of the directors, 171 neither the target company nor its
directors will be liable if the directors advise shareholders of subse-
quent, more attractive merger offers, causing the shareholders to
reject the earlier proposal. According to this line of cases, liability
will not accrue even if the directors, in response to a higher offer,
withdraw their promised recommendation of the proposed merger.
Other cases suggest, however, that contractual obligations may
arise prior to shareholder approval, thus presenting a potential con-
flict between contractual liabilities and securities and fiduciary ob-
ligations. 172 In Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc., 173 Itek
166. 331 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
167. Execution of the agreement had been authorized only by the purchaser's executive
committee.
168. 331 F. Supp. at 607. A trustee of the bank that was one of the estate's executors
also sermed as president and chief executive officer of the corporation.
169. Id. See text accompanying notes 193-94 infra.
170. See text accompanying notes 187-89 infra.
171. See 331 F. Supp. at 607.
172. See text accompanying notes 187-89 infra.
173. 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968).
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and Chicago Aerial Industries (CAI), with the approval of each cor-
poration's board of directors, executed a letter of intent outlining
the basic terms of an exchange of CAI assets for Itek stock. Each
corporation undertook to use reasonable efforts to reach and formal-
ize a final agreement, subject to approval by the CAI shareholders.
Despite the letter of intent and without giving Itek an opportunity
to revise the offer, CAI abandoned the proposed sale when it revived
the earlier interest of another party, which then made a more attrac-
tive offer to purchase the stock of the principal CAI shareholders for
cash. In a suit against CAI and the individuals who represented CAI
and its controlling shareholders 74 in the negotiations, Itek alleged
that failure to negotiate in good faith constituted a breach of con-
tract. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment
for the individual defendants but remanded the question of CAI's
liability.'75 Without discussing the possibility that shareholder ap-
proval was a prerequisite for binding CAI, the court instructed the
trial court to determine the legal effect of the preliminary letter
based upon the intent of the parties.'
76
Even though the Delaware court ultimately found the Itek let-
ter unenforceable,' 7  the decision in Mid-Continent Telephone Corp.
v. Home Telephone Co.'7 8 reemphasizes the significance of the par-
ties' intent. Two controlling officers of the primarily family-owned
Home Telephone Company signed a preliminary letter condition-
ally agreeing to a tax-free exchange of Home's assets for Mid-
Continent stock.'79 Home abruptly terminated negotiations toward
a final agreement after receiving a more attractive offer from Union
Telephone Company to purchase all of Home's common stock for
cash. After Union purchased Home's common stock, Mid-Continent
sued Home and the two controlling officers for breach of contract
and sued Union for tortious interference with a contract. Examining
174. The controlling shareholders owned approximately 50% of the CAI stock. Thus
their informal consent to the agreement with Itek would not have been sufficient to create a
binding contract under the reasoning of Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F.
Supp. 1176 (N.D. Miss. 1970). See text accompanying notes 181-82 infra.
175. In granting summary judgment, the trial court relied solely on the letter's provision
releasing the parties from further obligation if they failed to execute a formal contract. The
Delaware Supreme Court found, however, that release under this provision was conditioned
upon a good faith attempt to reach a final agreement. 248 A.2d at 629.
176. Id.
177. Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc., 274 A.2d 141 (Del. 1971).
178. 319 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
179. Those conditions included obtaining a favorable ruling from the IRS and reaching
a mutually satisfactory employment contract for one of the two controlling officers of Home.
The court found that these contingencies were conditions precedent to performance of the
contract and not conditions precedent to formation of a binding contract. Id. at 1190.
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all the circumstances to determine the parties' intent,8 the court
concluded that the letter agreement was a binding contract. Reject-
ing the defendants' contention that the letter agreement could not
bind the corporation without formal stockholder approval, the court
explained that the informal approval of the common stockholders,
all members of the president's family, was sufficient.'8 ' Failure to
notify or obtain even informal consent from the nonfamily preferred
shareholders did not trouble the court, apparently because the pre-
ferred shareholders lacked sufficient votes to block the transac-
tion. 12 Although the decision in Mid-Continent to bind a corpora-
tion without formal shareholder approval may have been condi-
tioned upon the existence of a sufficient concentration of stock own-
ership to allow informal shareholder consent, the Itek court relied
upon the parties' intent without requiring even informal approval.
The multiple liabilities imposed in Mid-Continent indicate the
need for caution in deciding whether to make merger agreements
binding prior to shareholder approval. Although the individual offi-
cers escaped liability to Mid-Continent,' 83 the court assessed dam-
ages against Home for breach of contract and against Union for
tortious interference with the contract.' 84 In a subsequent suit, how-
ever, the court held the individual officers liable to Home, then
owned primarily by Union, for breaching their fiduciary duties and
tortiously defaulting as officers.'8 5 The officers' liability resulted
from their causing Home to breach the Mid-Continent agreement
without a corporate business purpose and solely for the family's
personal gain.'8
(2) Fiduciary Obligations
Even if execution of a preliminary plan or agreement of merger
180. Among the circumstances important to the court's conclusion were the actual
signing of the preliminary letter under the word "accepted" and the Home officers' refusal
to accept the third party's offer without first obtaining an opinion of counsel that the Mid-
Continent agreement was not binding. Id. at 1191.
181. Id. at 1195. But see Smith v. Good Music Station, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 262, 129 A.2d
242 (1957) (not mentioning possibility that informal consent might suffice).
182. See 319 F. Supp. at 1193-94.
183. The court found that the individuals signed solely in a representative capacity. Id.
at 1199.
184. The court found that Union acted recklessly and deliberately in inducing the
breach of an agreement that it knew or should have known was binding. Id. at 1200. In
American Cyanamid v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 331 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
however, the court rejected a claim for tortious interference with a contract because the
subsequent offeror concluded reasonably that no binding contract existed.
185. Home Tel. Co. v. Darley, 355 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd, 489 F.2d 1403
(5th Cir. 1974).
186. Id. at 999.
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creates a binding legal obligation, the directors of the target com-
pany cannot rely on that contractual obligation to justify complete
disregard of competing merger offers subsequently received. A pre-
liminary agreement, prior to shareholder approval, cannot eliminate
the target company's obligation under the federal securities law to
disclose competing merger offers.'87 Similarly, a preliminary agree-
ment cannot suspend the fiduciary obligations of the officers and
directors to protect the interests of the shareholders. Overlapping
with the federal proxy regulations, these fiduciary obligations pre-
vent management from obtaining shareholder approval of a merger
without disclosing higher offers.' 8 In addition, management's fidu-
ciary obligation to investigate alternative merger offers"9 may sur-
vive an agreement to merge with a particular company and may
require abandonment of that agreement if the terms of a subse-
quently received offer are better.
In Scott v. Stanton Heights Corp.,"' the court rejected the con-
tention that the directors' fiduciary duty should be extended to
require breach of an enforceable agreement in order to accept a
better offer received after execution of the agreement. This general
observation is undercut, however, by the Scott court's finding that
under any standard the directors had acted reasonably in the partic-
ular circumstances involved"' and by the American Cyanamid deci-
sion." 2 The American Cyanamid fiduciaries were the chief executive
officer of Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation and the executors of
the Arden estate, which owned all of the corporation's stock. The
court held that despite the corporation's possible liability for with-
drawing an irrevocable offer in order to accept a better deal, the
fiduciaries who controlled the corporation could not be liable. The
court's explanation that the duty to act for the best interest of the
shareholder estate put these fiduciaries "in a difficult position...
because of the higher offer""' suggests that in certain circumstances
fiduciaries may have an obligation to breach an existing agreement
187. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691, at 99,053 (N.D. Ohio 1968). As noted above, the
extent of this obligation is unclear.
188. Finklea v. Carolina Farms Co., 196 S.C. 466, 13 S.E.2d 596 (1941); see American
Cyanamid v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 331 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
189. Wander, supra note 17, at 549.
190. 388 Pa. 628, 131 A.2d 113 (1957).
191. The court pointed out that price is not the sole determinant of the worth of an offer,
noting the following relevant considerations: "certainty and promptness of payment; finan-
cial responsibility; established business relationships; [and] the performance of valid legal
obligations." Id. at 635, 131 A.2d at 116.
192. 331 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
193. Id. at 607.
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in order to accept a more advantageous offer. A breach effected to
fulfill legitimate fiduciary obligations is distinguishable from the
improper breach in Mid-Continent,'94 which the board effected to
allow the president and his family to benefit from a higher offer at
the expense of the corporation and its preferred shareholders. The
breach was therefore a violation, rather than an appopriate exercise,
of management's fiduciary obligations.
C. Defining Management's Obligations
A rule that no binding contractual obligations exist prior to
shareholder approval of a merger makes the commitment of time
and money necessary to investigate a merger partner and prepare a
merger proxy statement unnecessarily risky. Business ethics alone
are insufficient limitations on the right to abandon a proposed
merger prior to shareholder approval. Nevertheless, imposing con-
tractual liability on a corporation for action taken by management
in a good faith response to its obligations under federal securities
law or state fiduciary principles is also undesirable.'
9 5
Ideally, the preliminary merger plan or agreement should have
contractual force, with shareholder approval as a condition subse-
quent, and should by express terms reconcile the contractual obliga-
tions with the obligations imposed by securities law and fiduciary
principles. Absent an express term, however, the courts should re-
spond to business needs by recognizing contractual obligations prior
to shareholder approval, subject to an implied condition permitting
any action taken in good faith to comply with the federal securities
law or state fiduciary principles. Thus a corporation should not be
contractually liable if the required disclosure of a competing merger
offer causes the shareholders to reject a recommended merger. Even
if management withdraws a recommendation, postpones the share-
holders' meeting pending investigation of a competing merger offer,
or completely repudiates an existing agreement, prior to shareholder
approval, to pursue an offer more advantageous to the corporation,
no liability should result. Contractual liability should attach if, as
in Mid-Continent, the corporation abandoned the proposed merger
to pursue an offer more advantageous only to certain controlling
persons or if the original merger partner had no opportunity to
match a subsequent offer by modifying the original terms.'99
194. Home Tel. Co. v. Darley, 355 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd, 489 F.2d 1043
(5th Cir. 1974); Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Miss.
1970).
195. But see 331 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
196. Unless the advantages of the second offer derive from intangible factors, such as
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Furthermore, the extent of the directors' obligation to abandon
an existing bargain in order to pursue a competing merger offer that
may be more favorable must be defined. A number of nonprice
factors, such as capabilities of the offeror's management, quality of
the offeror's business history, and synergistic advantages to be
gained from a particular business combination, make competing
merger offers difficult to compare.'97 Absent clear evidence of abuse,
a court should not reverse management's good faith business judg-
ment that competing merger offers do not merit serious negotia-
tion., ' Requiring management to pursue a slightly better merger
offer received shortly before the shareholders' meeting would jeo-
pardize a nearly completed, favorable merger without assurance
that the second offer would result in a final agreement or that the
first offer could be revived if the second were later withdrawn.' "
Thus management must be accorded considerable discretion to re-
ject the particular risks involved in pursuing untimely merger offers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Uncertainty concerning the appropriate extent of shareholder
participation in a corporation's decision to merge underlies the com-
plex and interrelated problems confronting a corporation that re-
ceives multiple offers. This Note has urged that management should
have the primary role in making a merger decision. ' "' The fiduciary
nature of that role, however, should be emphasized in defining both
disclosure requirements and the legal effect of a merger agreement
prior to shareholder approval. By giving management the primary
role in making merger decisions while stressing the fiduciary nature
of that role, problems facing corporations that receive competing
merger offers can be solved realistically without compromising the
interests of shareholders.
the identity of the second offeror, and not merely from a more favorable price, bad faith
appears to be the only possible motivation for abandoning a pending merger without affording
an opportunity to meet the competition. Modification of an existing agreement clearly would
be easier and cheaper than negotiating an entirely new agreement with the second offeror.
197. See note 191 supra.
198. See United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp., [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691, at 99,047 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
199. See Scott v. Stanton Heights Corp., 388 Pa. 628, 131 A.2d 113 (1957).
200. Merger agreements recommended by management are rarely rejected. Eisenberg,
The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969). This fact suggests that shareholders lack the initiative to make an
independent evaluation of a merger proposal.
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